Research on the relationship between democracy and trade has so far neglected multilateral negotiations and more generally the content of trade agreements, in particular the market access bindings undertaken by countries. This article finds that more democratic countries undertake greater market access commitments under the multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). I argue that non-democratic regimes take fewer commitments, because these reduce their discretion in granting rents to ensure the support of small groups. In contrast, for democratic regimes, commitments that lock-in levels of access have lower costs because voters generally do not favour increased protectionism. Democracies also have greater incentives to take commitments since they signal good economic policy-making to voters. Moreover, the article finds that endowments have a direct impact on commitments. I argue that greater human capital endowments translate into greater pressures from industry groups for international commitments. The empirical analysis provides support for these propositions. The analysis also suggests that economic size and regulatory capacity are positively linked to GATS commitments.
Journal of World Trade