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'Editor’s Note', José Rivas, Issue 1, pp. 1–3 |
infoJosé Rivas, 'Editor’s Note' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 1–3 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010001 | 
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'The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the ECHR', Wouter P.J. Wils, Issue 1, pp. 5–29 |
infoWouter P.J. Wils, 'The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the ECHR' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 5–29 | | Some lawyers and businesses have claimed that, because of an increase in the level of antitrust fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years, these fines have become criminal in nature and that the current institutional and procedural framework in which fines are imposed by the European Commission, with subsequent judicial review by the EU Courts, is no longer compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This paper critically examines those claims. The main point to be retained is that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights distinguishes between, on the one hand, the hard core of criminal law and, on the other hand, cases which are ‘criminal’ within the autonomous meaning of the ECHR but which do not belong to the hard core of criminal law. Irrespective of any increase in their level, the antitrust fines imposed by the European Commission only belong to the second, broader category of criminal penalties, and the European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that it is compatible with the ECHR for such penalties to be imposed, in the first instance, by an administrative or non-judicial body such as the European Commission. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010002 |
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'Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchaser Standing: Should the Passing-on Defence Be Rejected Now the Indirect Purchaser Has Standing after Manfredi and the White Paper of the European Commission?', Süleyman Parlak, Issue 1, pp. 31–53 |
infoSüleyman Parlak, 'Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchaser Standing: Should the Passing-on Defence Be Rejected Now the Indirect Purchaser Has Standing after Manfredi and the White Paper of the European Commission?' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 31–53 | | The European Court of Justice (ECJ) recognized in Courage v. Crehan and recalled in Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA the right of ‘any’ individual to claim damages for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 EC. As a reaction to both judgments, the European Commission published, after the Ashurst report, a Green Paper and later a White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules. Two of the obstacles that private parties face in antitrust damages action are the indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence. This paper analyses both the indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence in a comparative law perspective, between the law of the United States and EC law. This paper finds, after analyzing the US case law and the current economic discussion around the passing-on issue, that it is too difficult for the judiciary to calculate the passing-on. This paper finds therefore that the choice to allow or reject both the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing is policy related. Finally, the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing in the EU and the European Commission’s White Paper is discussed. This paper finds that the European Commission’s choice to allow both the indirect purchaser standing and passing-on defence is justified from the perspective of policy considerations. Nevertheless, this paper concludes that the European Commission did not succeed in providing strong solutions to the problems that are associated with the indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010003 |
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'Fines against Parent Companies in EU Antitrust Law: Setting Incentives for ‘Best Practice Compliance’', Karl Hofstetter, Melanie Ludescher, Issue 1, pp. 55–76 |
infoKarl Hofstetter, Melanie Ludescher, 'Fines against Parent Companies in EU Antitrust Law: Setting Incentives for ‘Best Practice Compliance’' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 55–76 | | Antitrust fines imposed by the European Commission have reached record levels and have scratched or passed the EUR 1 billion mark in several cases. This expansion was, inter alia, made possible by the Commission’s practice to not only sanction responsible subsidiaries, but their parent companies as well. As a result, the fine cap, which Community law sets at 10% of the annual sales of responsible undertakings, has been ratcheted up significantly. This article maintains that the current practice of the European Commission, which finds at least arguable support in the case law of the Community courts, ignores the fundamental concept of limited liability for subsidiary corporations. It also lacks a sound basis in EU antitrust law. Perhaps most important, the fining practice of the Commission does not do justice to its pursued goal of effectively preventing antitrust violations by corporate managers and employees. Antitrust fines against corporations, be they subsidiaries or parent companies, should primarily be aimed at deterrence and therefore be based on fault. Absent any direct involvement in the antitrust violations of the top representatives of a corporation, fault on the part of the company should be defined as a deficiency in its compliance organization. ‘Best Practice Compliance’ should, therefore, take centre stage in an optimally designed antitrust fining policy. As a result, the amount of fines against companies, but also the question of whether a parent company bears co-responsibility for antitrust violations by its subsidiaries, should primarily hinge on whether and to what extent ‘Best Practice Compliance’ standards had been implemented. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010004 |
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'Using Abuse of Collective Dominance in Article 102 TFEU to Fight Tacit Collusion: The Problem of Proof and Inferential Error', Félix E. Mezzanotte, Issue 1, pp. 77–102 |
infoFélix E. Mezzanotte, 'Using Abuse of Collective Dominance in Article 102 TFEU to Fight Tacit Collusion: The Problem of Proof and Inferential Error' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 77–102 | | Recent events suggest that Article 102 TFEU may prohibit the abusive conduct of tacitly colluding firms. Yet can the Commission enforce this law? In this article, I argue that it cannot. I show that proof of ongoing tacit collusion requires the Commission to overcome a difficult problem of identification, notably how to distinguish tacit collusion from other very subtle conducts like unconscious parallelism and undetected overt collusion. I claim that the Commission cannot resolve this problem by establishing the typical conditions drawn from case law, such as the lack of effective competition, the Airtours criteria and a focal point, as proof of these conditions cannot mitigate error sufficiently. Abusive and tacitly collusive conduct may not even be at all plausible in real world. I conclude that a problem of detection and costly error restricts dramatically the ability of the Commission to combat tacit collusion by using Article 102. Such a policy, if carried out, would be misguided. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010005 |
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'The Standstill Obligation in the ECMR', Frederic Depoortere, Stephane Lelart, Issue 1, pp. 103–120 |
infoFrederic Depoortere, Stephane Lelart, 'The Standstill Obligation in the ECMR' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 103–120 | | This article discusses the standstill obligation under the EC Merger Regulation (ECMR) and a number of issues arising from its application in the context of acquisitions of minority shareholdings as well as possible solutions to address these issues. The standstill obligation is often characterized as a cornerstone of the ECMR. The EUR 20 million fine imposed by the Commission on Electrabel in June 2009 confirms that the Commission will take the enforcement of the standstill obligation very seriously. However, there are a number of issues in the interpretation of the standstill obligation that make its application in real-world cases extremely complex. Now that the Electrabel decision has increased the price of making mistakes, the importance of the issues surrounding the practical application of the standstill obligation has increased as well. This article focuses on the application of the standstill obligation in the context of acquisitions of minority shareholdings and more particularly the concepts of (1) de facto control, (2) partial implementation, and (3) interrelated transactions. This article then goes on to propose a number of possible solutions to enhance the level of legal certainty for practitioners and undertakings. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010006 |
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'Excessive Pricing and the Prohibition of the Abuse of a Dominant Position', Alla Pozdnakova, Issue 1, pp. 121–139 |
infoAlla Pozdnakova, 'Excessive Pricing and the Prohibition of the Abuse of a Dominant Position' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 121–139 | | This article contributes to the European debate on exploitative pricing abuses by dominant undertakings. Although it is questionable whether competition policy should interfere with such market behaviour, case law shows that Article 82 EC applies, in principle, to exploitative pricing abuses by dominant undertakings. The legal test for excessive pricing needs further clarification and simplification, although the test must remain sufficiently flexible for application on a case-by-case basis. The author discusses a range of factors to be taken into account when assessing the pricing policies of dominant undertakings and proposes extending the test beyond the cost-price analysis and to take into account other economic and behavioural considerations. The author further suggests that exploitative pricing abuses may arise not only under conditions of monopoly, where a single dominant company abuses its market power but also in markets jointly dominated by several actors (oligopoly). Exploitative pricing abuses under conditions of oligopoly may thus be tackled through the application of Article 82. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010007 |
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'South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five-Year Review', Chantal Lavoie, Issue 1, pp. 141–162 |
infoChantal Lavoie, 'South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five-Year Review' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 141–162 | | Five years since the adoption of South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy (CLP) in 2004, it is time to take stock. The CLP has proved a formidable tool for assisting the Competition Commission of South Africa in cartel enforcement. Few cartels were uncovered prior to 2004. Since then, major cartels have been dismantled and punished under the Competition Act, mostly as a result of increasing applications for immunity under the CLP. The CLP offers cartel members immunity from fines and from prosecution in return for information on the cartel. The stakes are high: only the first cartel member to approach the Commission gets immunity. The CLP sets out the framework and the conditions for being granted immunity. Recent amendments to the CLP, such as the addition of a marker procedure and oral statements procedure, have further enhanced the CLP’s attractiveness and reach. However, recent legislative amendments introducing criminal liability for persons involving their firms in cartel conduct are expected to affect the future of the CLP. This paper analyses the current provisions of the CLP and its impact on cartel enforcement. Finally, the scope for improvements and the future of the CLP will also be considered. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010008 |
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'Competition Law in Vietnam: A Critique', Mark Furse, Issue 1, pp. 163–176 |
infoMark Furse, 'Competition Law in Vietnam: A Critique' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 163–176 | | This article presents a critique of the Vietnamese Law on Competition, which entered into force on 1 July 2005. The fact that one of the ‘tiger’ economies enacted a competition law has gone largely unremarked, with very little being written about this law in English. While the lack of examination of the terms of the law may reflect simply a prioritization among the international community I argue here that other factors are also at play. At the time of writing only one formal decision has been made by the relevant enforcement authority. This lack of activity has undoubtedly had an impact on the profile enjoyed by the law, both inside and outside Vietnam. The regime is under-enforced, and although the authorities have undertaken advocacy work, recognition of the law within the country is only slowly growing. The external community may be as influenced by the structure of the law, which I argue here is overly complex and, partly as a result of this very complexity, lacking in clarity as it is by institutional dynamics. Some of the problems that beset the law at present are discussed and commented on here. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010009 |
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'Priceless: The Case that Brought Down the Visa/Mastercard Bank Cartel, by Lloyd Constantine. (Kaplan, 2009)', Spencer Weber Waller, Issue 1, pp. 177–177 |
infoSpencer Weber Waller, 'Priceless: The Case that Brought Down the Visa/Mastercard Bank Cartel, by Lloyd Constantine. (Kaplan, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 177–177 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010010 |
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'A Gap in the Enforcement of Article 82, by Ioannis Kokkoris. (BIICL)', Valentine Korah, Issue 1, pp. 178–178 |
infoValentine Korah, 'A Gap in the Enforcement of Article 82, by Ioannis Kokkoris. (BIICL)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 178–178 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010011 |
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'Article 82 EC: Reflections on Its Recent Evolution, by Ed Ariel Ezrachi. (Hart Publishing, 2009)', Valentine Korah, Issue 1, pp. 178–179 |
infoValentine Korah, 'Article 82 EC: Reflections on Its Recent Evolution, by Ed Ariel Ezrachi. (Hart Publishing, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 178–179 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010012 |
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'European Community Law of State Aid, edited by Kely Bacon. (Oxford University Press, 2009); Directory of EC Case Law on State Aids, by René Barents. (Kluwer Law International, 2008); State Aid Policy in the European Community, by Phedon Nicolaides, Mihalis Kekelekis & Maria Kleis. (Kluwer Law International, 2005); European State Aid Law and Policy, 2nd edn. by Conor Quigley. (Hart Publishing, 2009)', Ioannis Lianos, Issue 1, pp. 179–181 |
infoIoannis Lianos, 'European Community Law of State Aid, edited by Kely Bacon. (Oxford University Press, 2009); Directory of EC Case Law on State Aids, by René Barents. (Kluwer Law International, 2008); State Aid Policy in the European Community, by Phedon Nicolaides, Mihalis Kekelekis & Maria Kleis. (Kluwer Law International, 2005); European State Aid Law and Policy, 2nd edn. by Conor Quigley. (Hart Publishing, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 179–181 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010013 |
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'Cooperation between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law, by Silke Brammer. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009)', Abel Mateus, Issue 1, pp. 181–183 |
infoAbel Mateus, 'Cooperation between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law, by Silke Brammer. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 181–183 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010014 |
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'The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, 3rd edn. by Doris Hildebrand. (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009)', Timothy Swanson, Issue 1, pp. 183–184 |
infoTimothy Swanson, 'The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, 3rd edn. by Doris Hildebrand. (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 1, pp. 183–184 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010015 |
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ISSUE 2 | |
'Editor’s Note', José Rivas, Issue 2, pp. 185–186 |
infoJosé Rivas, 'Editor’s Note' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 185–186 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010016 |
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'The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases', Eric Gippini-Fournier, Issue 2, pp. 187–207 |
infoEric Gippini-Fournier, 'The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 187–207 | | Lawyers trained in common law systems often enquire about the applicable standard of proof when the EU Courts in Luxembourg (the General Court and the Court of Justice) review the legality of competition law decisions of the European Commission. This article shows that, despite occasional references in the English language versions of some recent judgments, the concept of ‘standard of proof’ as such does not form part of the Courts’ reasoning process. The EU Courts seem more influenced by the predominant conception in civil law countries – the vast majority of EU Member States have civil law systems – where the judge decides according to the persuasiveness of the evidence without being bound by pre-determined evidentiary or probability ‘thresholds’. The elusive and largely fruitless quest for ‘the’ standard of proof that has mired so many authors appears to be a blind alley. With specific reference to competition cases, the article then explores some factors (including, for example, the distinction between actions and consequences or the judge’s implicit views on economic ‘normality’), which may contribute to explaining the process of persuasion in litigation before the EU Courts. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010017 |
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'A Framework to Enforce Anti-predation Rules', Kai Hüschelrath, Jürgen Weigand, Issue 2, pp. 209–240 |
infoKai Hüschelrath, Jürgen Weigand, 'A Framework to Enforce Anti-predation Rules' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 209–240 | | The paper develops a theoretical framework to enforce anti-predation rules that explicitly takes the intervention stage into account. In particular, it is proposed to improve predation enforcement by focusing on two channels: refining the current regime and amending it. With respect to the refinement of the current predation enforcement regime, criteria for the imposition of optimal gain- or harm-based fines are derived in order to sharpen the deterrent effect of predation enforcement. However, given the very low probability of conviction for predators a policy proposal solely based on an increase in the fines for detected and convicted predators might be too weak to significantly amplify the deterrence effect in particular and to improve predation enforcement in general. As a consequence, the introduction of a pre-screening approach is proposed as an amendment to the current predation enforcement regime, which aims at identifying industries in which entry is difficult but desirable and a predation strategy might be a suitable instrument for an incumbent to fight such occasional entry attempts. In those industries, it is advisable to reduce the high standard of proof in predation enforcement, as its basic justification – the danger to create a negative deterrence effect – is significantly reduced. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010018 |
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'EU Competition Remedies in Consumer Cases: Thinking Out of the Shopping Bag', Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Stéphanie Strievi, Issue 2, pp. 241–255 |
infoJacques H.J. Bourgeois, Stéphanie Strievi, 'EU Competition Remedies in Consumer Cases: Thinking Out of the Shopping Bag' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 241–255 | | Compensation for victims of competition law infringements is not satisfactory in today’s European Union: too few victims seek damages. This is even truer in consumer cases. This article explains how a fairly simple alternative use of two current public competition law tools could contribute to improving this situation. Compensation could be accepted as an undertaking in the framework of a commitment procedure. Alternatively, compensation could be treated as a mitigating circumstance in the fine setting process. Previous Commission decisions and the case law show that the proposed solution is feasible. Compensation at the public enforcement stage clearly benefits consumers as victims, but also companies as (alleged) wrongdoers. Consumers receive an early and, in most cases, unexpected or unanticipated compensation. Companies obtain either the termination of the investigation that has been initiated or the reduction of their fine. The benefit of this alternative remedy is extended to competition law enforcement in both its private and public forms. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010019 |
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'Unchallenged Market Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private Labels, and Competition Law', Ariel Ezrachi, Issue 2, pp. 257–274 |
infoAriel Ezrachi, 'Unchallenged Market Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private Labels, and Competition Law' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 257–274 | | The proliferation of private labels has transformed the landscape of retail competition in developed countries. Major retailers are no longer confined to their traditional roles of purchasers and distributors of branded goods. By selling their own label products they compete with their upstream brand suppliers on sales and shelf space. The paper explores the emergence of ‘vertical competition’ between retailers and suppliers and the pro-competitive and possible anti-competitive effects that stem from the use of private labels. It reviews the enforcement of European competition laws in a private label environment and the difficulty in balancing the beneficial short-term effects of private labels and their possible, harmful, long-term effects. It subsequently questions whether these difficulties imply a lack of competitive harm or reflect a gap in regulation, as traditional analysis fails to encompass the increased market power of retailers and the competitive effects of private labels. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010020 |
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'Competition and Development: Towards an Institutional Foundation for Competition Enforcement', Abel M. Mateus, Issue 2, pp. 275–300 |
infoAbel M. Mateus, 'Competition and Development: Towards an Institutional Foundation for Competition Enforcement' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 275–300 | | We bring together three strands of contributions to the study of institutions in the development process in order to lay down the foundations for an economic approach to the formulation of competition policies and competition law. Competition policies need to be complemented by trade, industrial, and procurement policies that provide the context for the operation of any policy regime in developing countries, laying down the foundations of a competitive market economy. First, models of the political economy of development that incorporate interest groups and their influence in the political process show that when a small group of vested interests dominate economic policy there is little room for competition policy. Second, based on the decision theory and the theory of torts of Glaeser and Shleifer we define the different regimes of competition law according to the capability to avoid subversion, elicit the optimal precaution of damages, and minimize information costs. This shows that competition regimes should be graduated by the level of institutional development. Third, we characterize the level of institutional development with a composite index of governance and government capture. Bringing together these three strands of research, we stress the need that the competition policy regime should fit each institutional level of development. We thus propose a research agenda to help policy makers and advisers better ground competition regimes and laws. This type of approach of policy, paying particular attention to the institutional background, could be applied to most areas of policy and law. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010021 |
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'The Enforcement and Development of Korean Competition Law', Yo Sop Choi, Issue 2, pp. 301–315 |
infoYo Sop Choi, 'The Enforcement and Development of Korean Competition Law' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 301–315 | | Competition law and policy in the Republic of Korea (‘Korea’) have been developing since the first legislation in 1980, focusing on prohibiting unfair business practices. The Korean competition authority has heavily relied on legal provision on unfair business practices rather than unfair concerted practices, or abuse of market dominance in its enforcement. This provision is unique, giving the Korean competition authority full power in its implementation of law. However, implementation of this legal provision is very unclear, since it can be used as a catch-all provision. This article discusses of crucial problems in Korean competition law and critically analyses current implementation. It then suggests amendments to provisions on unfair business practices. This article adopts a categorization approach based on market share threshold, by looking at other competition regimes’ legal techniques and re-examining them in the Korean context. This article argues that simplified language through clear market power presumption, by means of a market share threshold test, provides concrete guidance for competition law in the civil law system. The Korean competition authority will subsequently narrow the scope of the provision on unfair business practices and develop implementation of law based on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of market dominance. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010022 |
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'Competition Law Enforcement in the Television Broadcasting Sector in Hong Kong: Past Cases and Recent Controversies', Thomas K. Cheng, Issue 2, pp. 317–343 |
infoThomas K. Cheng, 'Competition Law Enforcement in the Television Broadcasting Sector in Hong Kong: Past Cases and Recent Controversies' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 317–343 | | This article reviews the competition law regime in the television broadcasting sector in Hong Kong. This regime governs one of the only two sectors in Hong Kong subject to competition law enforcement until the government promulgates a cross-sector competition law. The article begins with an overview of the state of competition in the sector, highlighting trends in recent development that are relevant to competition law enforcement. This is followed by an examination of the two main competition provisions in the Broadcasting Ordinance and the guidelines issued by the Broadcasting Authority, the sectoral regulator. It argues that one of the greatest flaws in the provisions is their designation of the downstream market as the relevant market, hence exacerbating the limitations of a sectoral regime. This article continues with a critical review of the existing decisional practices, focusing on the regulator’s treatment of market definition, predatory pricing, and causation. It argues that the regulator has largely failed to apply rigorous analysis to these issues and has adopted an overly stringent standard for causation. It concludes with an analysis of a recent controversy in the sector – the dominant terrestrial broadcaster’s alleged imposition of exclusivity on artists, which prevent these artists from appearing on rival channels. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010023 |
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'Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, by Michael A. Carrier. (Oxford University Press, 2009)', Spencer Weber Waller, Issue 2, pp. 345–345 |
infoSpencer Weber Waller, 'Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, by Michael A. Carrier. (Oxford University Press, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 345–345 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010024 |
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'European Competition Law Annual 2008, Antitrust Settlements under EC Competition Law, edited by Ehlermann & Marquis. (Hart Publishing, 2010)', Valentine Korah, Issue 2, pp. 346–346 |
infoValentine Korah, 'European Competition Law Annual 2008, Antitrust Settlements under EC Competition Law, edited by Ehlermann & Marquis. (Hart Publishing, 2010)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 346–346 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010025 |
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'Competition Law of the European Community, by Van Bael & Bellis. 5th edn (Kluwer Law International and Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2010)', Valentine Korah, Issue 2, pp. 346–348 |
infoValentine Korah, 'Competition Law of the European Community, by Van Bael & Bellis. 5th edn (Kluwer Law International and Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2010)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 346–348 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010026 |
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'Article 81 EC and Public Policy, by Christopher Townley. (Hart Publishing, 2009)', Valentine Korah, Issue 2, pp. 348–349 |
infoValentine Korah, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy, by Christopher Townley. (Hart Publishing, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 348–349 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010027 |
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'EU Competition Law in Context, Essays in Honour of Virpi Tiili, by Heikki Kanninen, Nina Korjus & Allan Rosas. (Hart Publishing, 2009)', Valentine Korah, Issue 2, pp. 349–350 |
infoValentine Korah, 'EU Competition Law in Context, Essays in Honour of Virpi Tiili, by Heikki Kanninen, Nina Korjus & Allan Rosas. (Hart Publishing, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 349–350 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010028 |
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'Competition Policy International, edited by David Evans. (vol. 5, no. 2, Published twice a year by CPI)', Valentine Korah, Issue 2, pp. 350–350 |
infoValentine Korah, 'Competition Policy International, edited by David Evans. (vol. 5, no. 2, Published twice a year by CPI)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 350–350 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010029 |
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'Telecommunications Law and Regulation, edited by Ian Walden. 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2009); EC Competition Law and Telecommunications Law, edited by Christian Koenig et al. 2nd edn (Kluwer Law International, 2009); EU Competition Law and Regulation in the Converging Telecommunications, Media and IT Sectors, by Nikos Th. Nikolinakos. (Kluwer Law International, 2006)', Andrej Fatur, Issue 2, pp. 350–352 |
infoAndrej Fatur, 'Telecommunications Law and Regulation, edited by Ian Walden. 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2009); EC Competition Law and Telecommunications Law, edited by Christian Koenig et al. 2nd edn (Kluwer Law International, 2009); EU Competition Law and Regulation in the Converging Telecommunications, Media and IT Sectors, by Nikos Th. Nikolinakos. (Kluwer Law International, 2006)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 350–352 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010030 |
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'Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest, by Eugene Buttigieg. (Wolters Kluwer, 2009)', Michal S. Gal, Issue 2, pp. 352–353 |
infoMichal S. Gal, 'Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest, by Eugene Buttigieg. (Wolters Kluwer, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 352–353 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010031 |
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'State and Market in European Union Law, by Wolf Sauter & Harm Schepel. (Cambridge University Press, 2009)', Mel Marquis, Issue 2, pp. 353–354 |
infoMel Marquis, 'State and Market in European Union Law, by Wolf Sauter & Harm Schepel. (Cambridge University Press, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 353–354 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010032 |
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'Understanding EU Commission Tenders: A practical guide, by Bernard O’Connor. (Intersentia, 2010)', Geoffroy van de Walle de Ghelcke, Issue 2, pp. 354–355 |
infoGeoffroy van de Walle de Ghelcke, 'Understanding EU Commission Tenders: A practical guide, by Bernard O’Connor. (Intersentia, 2010)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 2, pp. 354–355 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010033 |
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ISSUE 3 | |
'Editor’s Note', José Rivas, Issue 3, pp. 357–358 |
infoJosé Rivas, 'Editor’s Note' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 357–358 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
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ID: WOCO2010034 |
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'The 2006 Guidelines on Fines: Reflections on the Commission’s Practice', Fernando Castillo de la Torre, Issue 3, pp. 359–416 |
infoFernando Castillo de la Torre, 'The 2006 Guidelines on Fines: Reflections on the Commission’s Practice' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 359–416 | | This article explores the practice so far in the application of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines of the European Commission. The different steps in the calculation are examined in separate sections, and the analysis also takes into account the most recent case law of the European Union (EU) Courts. This article concludes that the current level of fines is by no means excessive, while at the same time the guidelines offer the necessary modulations to allow account to be taken of the particularities of each case and the liability of each undertaking. The value of sales, a possible different percentage for gravity, the multiplier for duration, and the application of adjustments all ensure that proper account is taken, where appropriate, of more intense or limited participation by a given undertaking. The application of the 2006 Guidelines to past cases does not breach the principle that no heavier penalty will be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the offence was committed. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010035 |
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'Undistorted, (Un)fair Competition, Consumer Welfare and the Interpretation of Article 102 TFEU', Anca Daniela Chiriţă, Issue 3, pp. 417–436 |
infoAnca Daniela Chiriţă, 'Undistorted, (Un)fair Competition, Consumer Welfare and the Interpretation of Article 102 TFEU' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 417–436 | | This article explains the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions relating to competition policy and offers a dynamic interpretation of Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which could justify the consideration of an effects-based approach to those anti-competitive practices that are most harmful to the final consumers under the economic theory of consumer welfare. The implications of ‘consumerprotection requirements’ must shed special light on Article 12 TFEU. Therefore, this article examines the possibility of shifting the courts’ teleological interpretation of Article 102, which is based on Protocol 27’s ‘undistorted competition’, towards a legal balancing test of the Treaty’s objectives. It also highlights the interpretation of undistorted competition within the internal market and the interplay between EU ‘free’ and fair and unfair competition rules. The balance of EU competition law should, therefore, be performed between Article 119 TFEU’s free competition or economic freedom-based competition and Article 12 as ensuring a ‘high level of protection’, as embedded in the Treaty, for the final consumers. This article explains how consumer-protection requirements must be defined narrowly so that Article 12 may be applied to Article 102. Article 12 can, therefore, mandate a high level of consumer protection for the final consumers in implementing such a specific policy as the abuse of dominance. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010036 |
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'Sub-national Geographic Markets within the Electronic Communications Sector', Liyang Hou, Issue 3, pp. 437–456 |
infoLiyang Hou, 'Sub-national Geographic Markets within the Electronic Communications Sector' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 437–456 | | Traditionally the geographic market definition in the electronic communications sector in the field of EU competition law was significantly relied on two factors: network reach and regulatory conditions. This method, after introduced into the electronic communications regulation, usually led to the definition of national markets. Nevertheless, the recent uneven investments in electronic communications infrastructures have results into regional variance in competitive conditions within some Member States. This fact makes the definition of national markets no longer appropriate. In order to demonstrate this trend in market definition, the national regulatory authorities, with the assistance of the European Commission, established a new approach to define geographic markets, in particular sub-national geographic markets. Nevertheless, this approach has not yet attracted much academic attention. The objective of this article is thus to provide a detailed description of this new approach. Based on a number of recent Commission decisions, it identifies two-step analysis: (1) to define geographic units and (2) to group geographic units with homogeneous conditions of competition. Subsequently, a discussion of the criteria used for each of the two steps and an evaluation of this approach are provided as well. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010037 |
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'Competition Law and Policy in Developing Countries: A Critical Assessment of the Challenges to Establishing an Effective Competition Law Regime', Maher M. Dabbah, Issue 3, pp. 457–475 |
infoMaher M. Dabbah, 'Competition Law and Policy in Developing Countries: A Critical Assessment of the Challenges to Establishing an Effective Competition Law Regime' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 457–475 | | This article offers a critical assessment of the challenges facing developing countries in their efforts to establish effective competition law regimes domestically. In doing so, the article considers the unique circumstances and interests of developing countries and gives numerous examples from practice in order to analyse all of the crucial aspects of this topic. The article considers the challenges facing developing countries in a wider cultural, economic, legal and political context in order to give proper reflection of the true reality prevailing in developing countries and demonstrate how competition law and policy in these countries is a unique topic, which raises issues different from those specialists are usually familiar with from the experience of the developed world in the field. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010038 |
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'Anti-monopoly, National Security and Industrial Policy: Merger Control in China', Wu Li-fen, Issue 3, pp. 477–497 |
infoWu Li-fen, 'Anti-monopoly, National Security and Industrial Policy: Merger Control in China' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 477–497 | | China has attracted the world’s attention since it enacted its Anti-monopoly Law (AML) in August 2007. Discussion relating to merger control is frequently focused on the AML, without adequate observation to other legislation. This article argues that competition matters, which are embodied in the AML, are not the whole of the existing regime of Chinese merger control. A three ‘pillar structure’ of the regime in relation to foreign mergers, that is, anti-monopoly review, national security review, and entry review, may be seen to have been formed. Competition, national security, and industrial policy may all be considered in the assessment of foreign mergers. While it remains to be seen how industrial policy will precisely be advanced in both legislation and practice, the policy may occupy a major position in the current regime. This is understandable given the current stage of the China’s economic transition. Policy makers are however urged to establish a merger control regime that is clear-cut and transparent, from which legal certainty flows. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010039 |
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'Comparative Analysis of Competition Laws on Buyer Power in Korea and Japan', Yo Sop Choi, Kazuhiko Fuchikawa, Issue 3, pp. 499–519 |
infoYo Sop Choi, Kazuhiko Fuchikawa, 'Comparative Analysis of Competition Laws on Buyer Power in Korea and Japan' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 499–519 | | Competition authorities frequently focus more on the effects of the power of sellers than the power of buyers. Competition laws and policies that address the issue of buyer power are also diverse across different jurisdictions. This raises difficult problems for assessing the practice of buyer power. The competition authorities in the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) and Japan have scrutinized a number of cases of buyer power involving large retail businesses. This article examines the current application of the laws relating to buyer power in Korea and Japan, by a comparative study, in order to contribute to improved implementation of competition law. This article analyses the existing competition laws on buyer power and their implementation in Korea and Japan to discern the common issues arising from their similar regulatory structure. These include: (1) the problem of overlap between the provisions on abuse of market dominance or monopolization and the provisions on unfair business practices (UBPs); (2) the problem of the presumption of superior bargaining position of large retail businesses; and (3) the issue of balancing tests of the positive and negative effects of buyer power. We argue that the distinctive approaches to buyer power under the competition laws of Korea and Japan reflect incentives different from those of other competition regimes with regard to the different legislative structure. This article finally gives further suggestions focusing on practical matters. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010040 |
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'Competition Law and Policy in Senegal: A Cautionary Tale for Regional Integration?', Daniel P. Weick, Issue 3, pp. 521–540 |
infoDaniel P. Weick, 'Competition Law and Policy in Senegal: A Cautionary Tale for Regional Integration?' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 521–540 | | This article surveys the development of competition policy in Senegal since 1994. It discusses the original Senegalese competition law and its early enforcement and the pre-emption of Senegal’s competition law enforcement by a decision from the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Court of Justice. Because Senegal had begun to develop competition law enforcement competency and the WAEMU is severely lacking in competition law enforcement resources, the pre-emption decision has been a disaster for competition policy in Senegal. Participation in WAEMU is on balance beneficial to Senegal and the Court of Justice is unlikely to revisit its opinion, so this paper examines ways Senegal may rehabilitate competition policy and promote liberal markets within the boundaries of the Court of Justice opinion. While not ideal, use of sector-specific regulations, criminal penalties for cartel behaviour, and aggressive pursuit of competition investigations with an eye to forcing WAEMU action could all provide the necessary oversight to open and preserve liberal markets. The Senegalese National Competition Commission should also undertake appropriate studies to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the Senegalese economy and the competition problems it faces. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010041 |
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'ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Competition as Public Policy (2010)', Spencer Weber Waller, Issue 3, pp. 541–541 |
infoSpencer Weber Waller, 'ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Competition as Public Policy (2010)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 541–541 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010042 |
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'ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Class Action Handbook (2010)', Spencer Weber Waller, Issue 3, pp. 542–542 |
infoSpencer Weber Waller, 'ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Class Action Handbook (2010)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 542–542 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010043 |
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'Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform, by Ed Barry J. Rodger. (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2010)', Valentine Korah, Issue 3, pp. 542–543 |
infoValentine Korah, 'Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform, by Ed Barry J. Rodger. (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2010)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 542–543 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010044 |
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'The Law of Criminal Cartels – Practice and Procedure, by Michael O’Kane. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)', Florian Wagner-von Papp, Issue 3, pp. 543–544 |
infoFlorian Wagner-von Papp, 'The Law of Criminal Cartels – Practice and Procedure, by Michael O’Kane. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 543–544 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010045 |
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'European Cartel Digest, edited by Ewoud Sakkers & Johan Ysewyn. (Austin: Kluwer Law International, October 2009)', Florian Wagner-von Papp, Issue 3, pp. 544–545 |
infoFlorian Wagner-von Papp, 'European Cartel Digest, edited by Ewoud Sakkers & Johan Ysewyn. (Austin: Kluwer Law International, October 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 3, pp. 544–545 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010046 |
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ISSUE 4 | |
'Editor’s Note', José Rivas, Issue 4, pp. 547–548 |
infoJosé Rivas, 'Editor’s Note' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 547–548 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010047 |
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'Leeway of Member States in Shaping the Notion of an ‘Undertaking’ in Competition Law', Marek Szydło, Issue 4, pp. 549–568 |
infoMarek Szydło, 'Leeway of Member States in Shaping the Notion of an ‘Undertaking’ in Competition Law' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 549–568 | | While generally the notions of an undertaking accepted within national competition laws are very similar or even identical to the notion of an undertaking adopted under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), there are nevertheless still some divergences existing in that respect. The present article argues that Member States are fully allowed to widen the national concept of an undertaking in comparison with the EU competition law, because, among others, such an extension takes the relevant national norms outside the (personal) scope of application of Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU and does not infringe the convergence rule (included in Article 3(2) of Regulation 1/2003). On the other hand, Member States are not allowed to narrow the national concept of an undertaking as compared with the one accepted under Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU. The restriction of the discussed notion within the national competition law as compared with that accepted under Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU is always carried out within the scope of application of the above-mentioned Articles of the TFEU, and the principle of supremacy of EU law over national law clearly excludes such national actions. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010048 |
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'The Use and Abuse of Intent Evidence in Antitrust Analysis', Maria João Melícias, Issue 4, pp. 569–594 |
infoMaria João Melícias, 'The Use and Abuse of Intent Evidence in Antitrust Analysis' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 569–594 | | References in recent case law to a firm’s ‘anticompetitive malice’ and ‘dreams of monopoly’ or to documentary evidence purporting to show a firm’s malevolent plans to squash a rival and ‘pre-empt the market’ may sound puzzling in a modern antitrust world supposedly driven by the objectivity of economic theory. This article discusses the meaning of intent in antitrust analysis and whether this element should be given any role in abuse cases and, in the affirmative, what role should that be. To this effect, it carries out a comparative exercise on the relevance of intent evidence in abuse investigations under US and EU laws. Although it primarily focuses on predation, it also considers other forms of exclusionary conduct where appropriate. It then explores the interplay between the different uses of this standard, the notion of anticompetitive harm, and the goals of antitrust in the two jurisdictions. Finally, it examines the consequences of adopting a given intent rule in terms of policy enforcement. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010049 |
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'Group Liability for Antitrust Infringements: Responsibility and Accountability', Richard Burnley, Issue 4, pp. 595–614 |
infoRichard Burnley, 'Group Liability for Antitrust Infringements: Responsibility and Accountability' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 595–614 | | The principle of ‘group liability’ can have huge significance for corporate groups yet there has been considerable uncertainty about its nature and scope. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ’s) ruling in Akzo answers some questions but raises others. Does the logic of the ‘wholly owned’ presumption apply to shareholdings of less than but near to100%? How can the presumption be rebutted in practice? What is the position with respect to part-owned subsidiaries? What is the standard of proof? This article considers the current position on group liability for cartel infringements under EU competition law, setting out and explaining in detail the basis on which parent companies may be held accountable for antitrust offences carried out by their subsidiaries. It goes on to consider how the principle might best be applied to achieve the overall regulatory goals of maximum deterrent effect while ensuring the fairest outcome in every case. In conclusion, the article suggests the need for a specific set of Commission Guidelines laying down the broad parameters of the group liability in EU competition law. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010050 |
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'Banking Competition in Europe: Antitrust Authorities at Work in the Wake of the Financial Crisis', Elena Carletti, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stefano Caiazza, Caterina Giannetti, Issue 4, pp. 615–642 |
infoElena Carletti, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Stefano Caiazza, Caterina Giannetti, 'Banking Competition in Europe: Antitrust Authorities at Work in the Wake of the Financial Crisis' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 615–642 | | In the financial intermediation industry, competition issues interact with those concerned with stability, as the current crisis unfortunately reminded us. This paper discusses and summarizes recent inquiries into retail banking undertaken by the European Commission and various National Competition Authorities, commenting on the methodologies and perspectives that these institutions have used to analyse competition in a sector that was, for a long time, considered ‘special’. While the identified competitive problems and solutions closely match those highlighted by academic research, too little attention still appears to be given to risk considerations, which would allow competition authorities to counter the likely forthcoming attacks that will again be aimed at isolating the financial industry from appropriate competitive checks. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010051 |
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'Contesting Market Leadership: Intellectual Property, Competition, and Regulatory Review in the US Traits and Seeds Market 2010', Ralf Boscheck, Issue 4, pp. 643–661 |
infoRalf Boscheck, 'Contesting Market Leadership: Intellectual Property, Competition, and Regulatory Review in the US Traits and Seeds Market 2010' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 643–661 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010052 |
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'The Definition of the Relevant Market and the Degree of Market Concentration in the Emerging Economies: Case Study on Brazil and Argentina', Marco Botta, Issue 4, pp. 663–682 |
infoMarco Botta, 'The Definition of the Relevant Market and the Degree of Market Concentration in the Emerging Economies: Case Study on Brazil and Argentina' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 663–682 | | The paper analyses the challenges faced by the National Competition Authorities (NCA) of the emerging economies in the application of the econometric tests usually relied on in the merger control analysis. The relevant market and the degree of market concentration are usually defined on the basis of two econometric tests, namely, the Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Price Increase (SSNIP) test and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Following the example of the US and the EU Merger Guidelines, the newly established NCAs of the emerging economies often refer to these two econometric tests in their merger guidelines without taking in consideration the challenges that they will have to face in applying them. The paper is a case study on Brazil and Argentina, and it aims at defining such challenges. The paper argues in favour of granting a broader margin of discretion to the NCAs of the emerging economies in applying such tests and in favour of the possibility to introduce alternative parameters to apply such tests in comparison to those ones identified by the US and the EU Merger Guidelines. Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010053 |
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'European Commission Decisions on Competition – Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and Merger Cases, by Francesco Russo, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Andrea Gunster, & Marten Carree. (Cambridge University Press)', Valentine Korah, Issue 4, pp. 683–684 |
infoValentine Korah, 'European Commission Decisions on Competition – Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and Merger Cases, by Francesco Russo, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Andrea Gunster, & Marten Carree. (Cambridge University Press)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 683–684 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010054 |
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'Research Handbook on Intellectual property and Competition Law, Josef Drexl. (Edward Elgar, 2008)', Ioannis Lianos, Issue 4, pp. 684–685 |
infoIoannis Lianos, 'Research Handbook on Intellectual property and Competition Law, Josef Drexl. (Edward Elgar, 2008)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 684–685 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010055 |
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'Competition Law and Patents – A Follow-on Innovation Perspective in the Biopharmaceutical Industry, Irina Haracoglou. (Edward Elgar, 2008); Competition Law, Innovation and Antitrust – An Analysis of Tying and Technological Integration, Hedvig Schmidt. (Edward Elgar, 2009); Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust – A Comparative Study of US and EU Approaches, Katarzyna Czapracka. (Edward Elgar, 2009)', Ioannis Lianos, Issue 4, pp. 685–687 |
infoIoannis Lianos, 'Competition Law and Patents – A Follow-on Innovation Perspective in the Biopharmaceutical Industry, Irina Haracoglou. (Edward Elgar, 2008); Competition Law, Innovation and Antitrust – An Analysis of Tying and Technological Integration, Hedvig Schmidt. (Edward Elgar, 2009); Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust – A Comparative Study of US and EU Approaches, Katarzyna Czapracka. (Edward Elgar, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 685–687 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010056 |
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'Anti-cartel Enforcement Worldwide, Volumes I (Albania-Finland), II (France-Norway), III (Pakistan-Venezuela), edited by Maher M. Dabbah & Barry Hawk. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)', Assimakis P. Komninos, Issue 4, pp. 687–689 |
infoAssimakis P. Komninos, 'Anti-cartel Enforcement Worldwide, Volumes I (Albania-Finland), II (France-Norway), III (Pakistan-Venezuela), edited by Maher M. Dabbah & Barry Hawk. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 687–689 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010057 |
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'Competition Policy in the European Union, by Cini and McGowan. 2nd edition, (Palgrave Macmillan)', Mel Marquis, Issue 4, pp. 689–690 |
infoMel Marquis, 'Competition Policy in the European Union, by Cini and McGowan. 2nd edition, (Palgrave Macmillan)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 689–690 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010058 |
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'ABA Section of Antitrust Law, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine (Monograph 25) (2009)', Chad Brooker, Issue 4, pp. 691–691 |
infoChad Brooker, 'ABA Section of Antitrust Law, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine (Monograph 25) (2009)' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 691–691 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010059 |
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'Article Index', Issue 4, pp. 693–699 |
info'Article Index' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 693–699 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010060 |
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'Subject Index', Issue 4, pp. 701–716 |
info'Subject Index' (2010) 33 World Competition, Issue 4, pp. 701–716 | | Copyright © 2010 Kluwer Law International
All rights reserved ISSN: 1011-4548
ID: WOCO2010061 |
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